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INTRODUCTION
One of the most common criticisms of the Patient Protection and
1
Affordable Care Act (PPACA) is that it constitutes a government
takeover of America’s health care system. By this, of course, is meant
a federal government takeover. PPACA will certainly increase the federal government’s presence in health care. It imposes new federal
regulations on insurers, creates a new federal program for funding
health insurance for uninsured middle-income Americans, dramati-

†

Substantial portions of this Article are based in whole or in part on the author’s
personal experience as a National Association of Insurance Commissioners consumer
representative.
1
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119 (2010) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 21, 25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
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cally expands the Medicaid program, and in all likelihood will increase the influence of the Medicare program on the organization of
the overall health care delivery system.
Yet PPACA also expands the responsibility and authority of the
states. The states, for example, are primarily responsible for enforc2
ing PPACA’s insurance regulatory reforms. They are also responsible
for establishing the exchanges—the entities through which Americans
3
will purchase insurance and apply for subsidies —and for managing
4
reinsurance and risk adjustment programs. According to the Act,
states will be responsible for reviewing health insurance premiums
5
and for assisting consumers with complaints against their insurers.
However, PPACA not only increases the authority of the federal
and state governments, it also empowers and assigns significant responsibility to a private agency: the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC). The NAIC is a private, nonprofit organization that has coordinated the activities of the nation’s state and terri6
torial insurance commissioners since 1871. Its members are the in7
surance commissioners of the states and territories. Traditionally, the
NAIC has drafted model statutes and regulations for the states, served
as a clearinghouse for insurance data, and provided a forum for in8
surance commissioners to discuss and address regulatory issues.
This Article discusses the role of the NAIC in health care reform.
It first describes the role of the NAIC in the reforms initiated by PPACA,
then considers why Congress gave the NAIC significant responsibility
for health reform, and finally examines how the NAIC has carried out
2

Id. § 1321(a)–(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18041(a)–(b) (West Supp. 1B 2010).
See id.
4
See § 1311(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(b) (requesting that each state establish an
“American Health Benefit Exchange” to facilitate the purchase of individual health
plans and assist small business owners in providing health plans to their employees);
id. § 1341, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18061 (inviting states to enact reinsurance programs to provide reinsurance payments to insurance issuers that cover “high-risk individuals”); id.
§ 1343, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18063 (requesting states to assess a charge on “low actuarial risk
plans” and provide payment to “high actuarial risk plans”).
5
See id. sec. 1002, § 2793, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-93 (West Supp. 1A 2010) (providing
grants to states for the creation of “independent office[s] of health insurance assistance” to respond to complaints about coverage); id. sec. 1003, § 2794, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 300gg-94 (inviting states in conjunction with the Secretary of Health and Human Services to
establish a process for reviewing “unreasonable increases” in insurance premiums).
6
About the NAIC, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMISSIONERS & CENTER FOR INS. POL’Y &
RES., http://www.naic.org/index_about.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2011).
7
Id.
8
Id.
3
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these responsibilities. It contends that Congress found in the NAIC
not only a very effective partner for involving the states in health care
reform, but also a vehicle for gaining access to the technical expertise
and public engagement that is necessary for effective health care
reform implementation.
I. THE NAIC IN THE PATIENT PROTECTION
AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
9

Ten provisions of PPACA refer to the NAIC. Several of these sections require the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS)—which is primarily responsible for establishing the regulations that will implement PPACA—to consult with the NAIC. One
provision, for example, requires HHS to consult with the NAIC in de10
veloping a summary of benefits and a coverage disclosure document;
another requires HHS to define permissible age bands by conferring
11
with the NAIC; yet another requires HHS to work with the NAIC to
establish regulations to govern compacts for the interstate sale of in12
surance. Section 1341 instructs HHS to develop standards in consultation with the NAIC in order to establish an interim reinsurance program and mandates that assessments from insurers for funding the
13
reinsurance fund be based on NAIC estimates. Section 1321—the
central provision of PPACA that authorizes HHS to implement the Act’s
insurance market reform provisions—directs HHS to consult with the
NAIC in establishing regulations to implement the exchanges, qualified
health plan requirements, risk-adjustment and reinsurance provisions,
and the regulations that will create the insurances exchanges and other
14
insurance reforms of the Act.
Other sections of PPACA give the NAIC a more direct role in
PPACA’s implementation. The exchanges, for example, must adopt a
uniform enrollment form that takes into account criteria submitted by

9

See infra notes 10-22.
PPACA sec. 1001(5), § 2715, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-15.
11
Id. sec. 1201(4), § 2701(a)(3), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg(a)(3).
12
Id. § 1333, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18053 (West Supp. 1B 2010).
13
Id. § 1341(b)(1), (b)(3)(B)(iii), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18061(b)(1), (b)(3)(B)(iii).
14
See id. § 1321(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18041(a) (requiring the HHS Secretary to consult
with the NAIC in implementing regulations of health care exchanges).
10
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15

the NAIC to HHS. Another provision requests the NAIC to develop
model standards and forms for private insurers to use in reporting fraud
16
and abuse to state insurance commissioners or other state agencies. Yet
another section requests the NAIC to develop standard methodologies and
17
definitions for determining medical-loss ratios.
Finally, PPACA incorporates—or requests the NAIC to amend—
existing NAIC model laws. PPACA, for example, provides that procedures for external review of health plans must include the consumer
18
protections in the NAIC Uniform External Review Model Act. It also
instructs HHS to request the NAIC to revise its Medicare Supplement
insurance standards so as to require at least nominal cost sharing un19
20
der C and F policies, which currently have almost no cost sharing.
As implementation of PPACA has proceeded, moreover, the NAIC
has been given responsibilities even beyond those assigned by the statute
itself. HHS has not only consulted with the NAIC to develop the
summary of benefits and disclosure document, as PPACA requires, but
has also delegated to the NAIC the responsibility for convening the
panel of consumers, industry representatives, and regulators responsi21
ble under PPACA for drafting that document. The NAIC also developed at the request of HHS a form for insurers to use in fulfilling the
obligation PPACA imposes on them to justify unreasonable premium
22
increases. Finally, the NAIC has continued in its traditional role of
15

Id. § 1311(c)(1)(F), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(c)(1)(F) (requiring qualified health plans
to “utilize a uniform enrollment form . . . that takes into account criteria that the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners develops and submits to the Secretary”).
16
Id. sec. 6603, § 2794, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-95 (West Supp. 1A 2010).
17
Id. sec. 10101(f), § 2718(c), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-18(c).
18
Id. sec. 1001(5), § 2719(4), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-19(4); see also HEALTH CARRIER
EXTERNAL REVIEW MODEL ACT (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs 2010), available at
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_b_uniform_health_carrier_ext_rev_model_act.pdf.
19
Id. sec. 3210(a), § 1882(y), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395ss(y).
20
See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., CMS PRODUCT NO. 02110, CHOOSING
A MEDIGAP POLICY: A GUIDE TO HEALTH INSURANCE FOR PEOPLE WITH MEDICARE 11
(2011), available at http://www.medicare.gov/Publications/Pubs/pdf/02110.pdf (noting
that the C and F policies cover one-hundred percent of almost all benefits available).
21
See Letter from Jane Cline, President, Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, et al. to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., and Hilda Solis, Sec’y, U.S.
Dep’t of Labor (Dec. 17, 2010), available at http://www.naic.org/documents/
committees_b_consumer_information_ppaca_letter_to_sebelius.pdf (providing “the
standard definitions and standards for the summary of benefits and coverage” to HHS
and the Department of Labor).
22
See Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, Draft Rate Disclosure Form (May 25, 2010),
available at http://www.naic.org/documents/index_health_reform_rate_review_final_
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creating model statutes for the states. This task is quite important, since
PPACA requests that the states implement its regulatory requirements even
though many states currently lack the explicit authority to enforce federal
23
law otherwise. The NAIC has, for example, drafted model statutes to implement provisions of the reform law that took effect for plans beginning
24
six months after the effective data of PPACA.
II. WHY THE NAIC?
There are several apparent reasons that the NAIC was given these
responsibilities under the reform law. First, the NAIC asked for a role
in implementing the law. The NAIC represented to Congress that its
open and transparent model-law development process was the most
consumer-friendly approach for implementing PPACA—indeed, that
25
the NAIC’s process was superior to the HHS rulemaking process.
Congress responded by giving the NAIC a role.
Second, the NAIC is a natural partner for implementation given
the role of the states in the reform legislation. The Senate’s version of
PPACA, which was ultimately adopted by Congress, creates a partnership between federal and state governments for implementing the leg26
islation. As noted above, PPACA asks the states to enact and enforce
rate_filing_summary.pdf; see also PPACA sec. 1003, § 2794, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-94 (detailing the review process for “unreasonable increases in premiums”). HHS “reviewed
and incorporated elements” from this form in developing its own form. CTR. FOR
CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CMS-10379,
SUPPORTING STATEMENT FOR PAPERWORK REDUCTION SUBMISSION: RATE INCREASE REVIEW AND DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 6 (2011), available at http://www.cms.gov/
PaperworkReductionActof1995/PRAL/list.asp (search for document serial number 10379).
23
See Survey on State Authority to Enforce PPACA Immediate Implementation Provisions,
NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMISSIONERS & CENTER FOR INS. POL’Y & RES. (Aug. 5, 2010),
http://www.naic.org/documents/index_health_reform_section_ppaca_state_enforcement
_authority.pdf (surveying state law on PPACA-related enforcement authority).
24
These include provisions covering adult children up to age twenty-six, internal
and external review of adverse coverage decisions, preexisting conditions for children,
lifetime and annual limits on care, and rescissions. For links to NAIC draft model laws,
see Committees & Activities: Regulatory Framework (B) Task Force, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMISSIONERS & CENTER FOR INS. POL’Y & RES., http://www.naic.org/committees
_b_regulatory_framework.htm (visited Mar. 15, 2011).
25
See Letter from Roger A. Sevigny, President, Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, et al.
to Max Baucus, Chairman, Senate Fin. Comm. (Sept. 30, 2009), available at
http://www.naic.org/documents/testimony_0909_officers_to_baucus_healthcare.pdf
(arguing for the benefits of the NAIC model-law development process).
26
See Timothy S. Jost, Pro & Con: State Lawsuits Won’t Succeed in Overturning the Individual Mandate, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1225, 1225 (2010) (noting the Senate bill’s reliance
on the states for regulation and enforcement). The House bill, by contrast, would
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PPACA’s insurance reforms and to create the exchanges and risk27
transfer programs. But PPACA assigns to the federal government—
more specifically, to HHS—responsibility for adopting regulations to
28
implement the law. Cooperating and consulting with each of the
states independently while drafting these regulations would be unwieldy. Furthermore, given the existence of the NAIC, establishing a
new institutional framework to coordinate state insurance departments in addressing the technical problems raised by implementation
of PPACA’s insurance regulations would be redundant and unrealistic.
Of course, a number of associations represent the states: the National Council of State Legislatures (NCSL), the National Governors
Association (NGA), and more immediately relevant, the National
Council of Insurance Legislators (NCOIL). The NCSL and NGA,
however, do not have an established process for drafting model legislation or regulations. NCOIL does draft model legislation, but has
less experience with health insurance regulation and less history of
29
working with Congress on regulatory issues. Although all states are
considered members of NCOIL, only twenty-eight states are full con30
tributing members. The NAIC, by contrast, has an established program for drafting model laws and regulations and a structure that
enables it to draw on state technical staff to work on regulatory is31
32
sues. All states and territories participate fully in its activities. It was
have established a national “Health Choices Administration” and would have charged
this entity with implementing the legislation. See Affordable Health Care for America
Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. §§ 241–243 (2009) (detailing the responsibilities of the
independent agency and its commissioner).
27
See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text (outlining the general reform provisions as they relate to states).
28
PPACA § 1321(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18041(a)(1) (West Supp. 1B 2010) (allocating responsibility for issuing regulations to meet PPACA’s reform requirements to HHS).
29
NCOIL’s basic approach to Congress is one of confrontation rather than cooperation. See History and Purpose, NAT’L CONF. INS. LEGISLATORS, http://www.ncoil.org/
ncoilinfo/about.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (stating that “NCOIL is an adamant,
vocal opponent of any Congressional initiative” that runs against its organizational goals).
30
NCOIL Member States, NAT’L CONF. INS. LEGISLATORS, http://www.ncoil.org/
ncoilinfo/member.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2011).
31
See FAQ , NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMISSIONERS & CENTER FOR INS. POL’Y & RES.,
http://www.naic.org/documents/about_faq.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (describing the process of drafting model laws); Model Law Development Framework: Frequently
Asked Questions, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMISSIONERS & CENTER FOR INS. POL’Y & RES.,
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_models_faqs.pdf (last visited Mar. 15,
2011) (setting out the process and criteria for model-law development); Procedures for
Model Law Development: Adopted May 2007, Amended September 2008, NAT’L ASS’N INS.
COMMISSIONERS & CENTER FOR INS. POL’Y & RES., http://www.naic.org/
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therefore the obvious agent to collectively represent the states in collaborating with the federal government to address technical issues
PPACA raised.
The technical expertise available to the NAIC is a third advantage
that it offered for advising HHS on implementation issues. Prior to
the adoption of PPACA, HHS had only a handful of staff directly ded33
icated to the regulation of private insurance. The NAIC, on the other hand, had access through its committee and working group structure to the regulatory staff members of all of the states and territories,
34
including skilled actuaries, accountants, and lawyers. The regulatory
staff of HHS has grown dramatically since PPACA’s enactment with
the creation of the Office of Consumer Information and Insurance
35
Oversight (OCIIO). The OCIIO has recently been moved to the
Centers on Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and renamed the
Center for Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight
36
CCIIO’s expertise is supplemented by resources and
(CCIIO).
knowledge already existing in CMS, which oversees Medicare Ad-

documents/committees_models_procedures.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (describing NAIC’s model-law development criteria as well as procedures for developing guidelines, the adoption process, and implementing model laws).
32
See Map of NAIC States & Jurisdictions, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMISSIONERS & CENTER FOR INS. POL’Y & RES., http://www.naic.org/state_web_map.htm (last visited Mar.
15, 2011) (showing that all U.S. states and territories are members of the NAIC).
33
In 2008, HHS had only four people assigned to enforcement of the insurance
regulation provisions of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. See
Business Practices in the Individual Health Insurance Market: Termination of Coverage: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. 74-75 (2008) (statement of Abby L. Block, Director, Center for Drug and Health Plan Choice, Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services) (reporting that only four federal officials were responsible for ensuring that insurers complied with HIPAA “for the entire United States
of America”).
34
See Actuarial & Statistical Department, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMISSIONERS & CENTER
FOR INS. POL’Y & RES., http://www.naic.org/actuarial_statistical_dept.htm (last visited
Mar. 15, 2011) (describing the actuarial and statistical resources available to the
NAIC); Legal Division, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMISSIONERS & CENTER FOR INS. POL’Y &
RES., http://www.naic.org/legal_home.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (providing an
overview of resources available through the NAIC’s Legal Division).
35
See The Office of Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight, U.S. DEPARTMENT
HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, http://www.hhs.gov/ociio/index2.html (last visited Mar.
15, 2011) (presenting the OCIIO, the new office within HHS created to implement
PPACA requirements such as enforcing insurance compliance, providing state guidance, and compiling data on insurance options).
36
About Us, CENTER FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, http://cciio.cms.gov/
resources/about/index.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2011).
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37

vantage and Part D prescription drug plans; the Departments of
Treasury and Labor, which are responsible for regulating employee
38
benefit plans; and the Office of Personnel Management, which runs
39
the Federal Employee Health Benefits Program. Nevertheless, the
responsibility for regulation of private insurance has traditionally resided with the states, which continue to have the most expertise and
40
experience with such regulation. This was the expertise that the
NAIC offered the federal government for health reform implementation.
Federal law has often relied on the technical competence of private organizations to shape and implement regulatory policy. Since its
inception, the Medicare program has turned to private accreditation
agencies to establish standards for hospitals and other health care
41
providers as well as to certify compliance with these standards. Medicare and Medicaid also rely on accreditation of managed care organi42
zations. The Food and Drug Administration relies on private organi43
zations to inspect facilities where medical devices are manufactured.
37

See Helen Lee, CMS Oversight, 14 J. MANAGED CARE PHARMACY S22, S22 to S23
(2008) (describing CMS oversight of these programs).
38
See PATRICK PURCELL & JENNIFER STAMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34443,
SUMMARY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT (ERISA) 1 (2009)
(noting that the Treasury Department “oversees standards for plan participation, vesting, and funding” and the Labor Department “regulates fiduciary standards and requirements for reporting and disclosure of financial information”).
39
5 U.S.C. § 8909(a) (2006).
40
See Letter from Jane Cline, President, Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, et al. to Nancy
Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives, and Harry Reid, Majority Leader, U.S.
Senate ( Jan. 6, 2010), available at http://www.naic.org/documents/testimony_
100106_health_reform_letter_officers.pdf (noting that “[s]tate insurance regulators have
extensive experience and expertise in regulating health insurance” and that “[t]hey are
closer to consumers and have a better understanding of the markets they regulate”).
41
See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals: Private Regulation of Health Care and the Public Interest, 24 B.C. L. REV. 835, 840-45 (1983)
(detailing the accreditation procedures of the privately run Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Medicare and the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations: A Healthy Relationship?, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Autumn 1994, at 15, 15-17 [hereinafter Jost, Healthy Relationship?] (examining
Medicare’s reliance on the private Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations to accredit Medicare-financed health services).
42
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-22(e)(4) (providing that private accredition organizations
may accredit a Medicare Advantage organization that meets applicable standards); id. §
1396u-2(c)(2)(B) (allowing states not to duplicate the managed care accreditation requirements of private accrediting organizations).
43
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-157, MEDICAL DEVICES: STATUS OF FDA’S PROGRAM FOR INSPECTIONS BY ACCREDITED ORGANIZATIONS 6-9 (2007) (detailing the FDA medical-device accreditation process for private organizations).
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Private accreditation bodies offer the federal government specialized competence for addressing technical problems, as well as the
ability to respond quickly and agilely to regulatory problems as they
44
arise. The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, for example, regularly reviews its accreditation standards and
updates them much more frequently and rapidly than HHS updates
its corresponding hospital certification requirements, which are used
45
for nonaccredited hospitals. Similarly, the NAIC has the capacity,
through state agency staff, to analyze technical issues competently
46
and, when necessary, relatively quickly.
III. THE NAIC PROCESS
Congress also saw the NAIC as an attractive partner for HHS in
the implementation of PPACA because of the NAIC’s unusually open
47
and participatory administrative process. Although the NAIC meets
together for several days three times a year to carry out its business
(and occasionally holds interim meetings to address particular issues),
48
most of its work is carried out through open conference calls. These
are scheduled as needed, but when a rule is in the process of being
made, committees can meet once or twice a week for one to three
hours at a time. A drafting subgroup, composed of technical staff
drawn from several state insurance departments, prepares a proposal
which is circulated to regulators and to “interested parties” who have
49
The subgroup then
registered for participation in the process.
presents and discusses the proposal on a conference call. After the
44

See Jost, Healthy Relationship?, supra note 41, at 29-30 (naming cost savings and
adaptability as reasons that Congress may rely on private accreditation).
45
See id. at 30-31 (noting that changes in government regulation require both the
time consuming notice-and-comment process and “prolonged scrutiny from the Office
of Management and Budget,” which private accreditation companies can avoid).
46
See sources cited supra note 31.
47
See Procedures for Model Law Development: Adopted May 2007, Amended September
2008, supra note 31 (prescribing NAIC’s process for adopting model laws, which allows
interested parties to comment via committee). Much of the following description of
the NAIC process is based on my personal knowledge gained from my experience as a
funded consumer representative. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
48
See NAIC Conference Calls & Interim Meetings Calendar, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMISSIONERS & CENTER FOR INS. POL’Y & RES., http://www.naic.org/meetings_
calendar.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (demonstrating the range of topics and indicating that interested parties may participate in calls).
49
“Interested parties” are persons or entities, other than regulators, with an interest in the topic under consideration by the NAIC.
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subgroup has completed its consideration, the call is opened up—first
to other regulators and then to “interested parties”—and a discussion
that often involves a number of regulators and interested parties presenting varying perspectives follows. If an issue is resolved, a draft is
50
“exposed,” usually for at least a week, to receive written comments.
These written comments, as well as further oral comments, are considered at the next call.
Once all issues are resolved, the working group adopts a proposed
model law or regulation, which is then sent onto the appropriate
NAIC committee—usually the Health Insurance and Managed Care or
51
“B” Committee if health insurance issues are involved —for revision
and adoption. The committee usually considers the proposal on an
open call with participation by the working group, other regulators,
and interested parties. A proposal will finally be voted on by the NAIC
Executive Committee and the “Plenary,” the full body of all commissioners. The committees are composed of the commissioners them52
selves, as is the Plenary.
“Interested parties” who participate in the process may include insurers and their lobbyists and lawyers, but they also may include insurance agents and brokers, who seem to exercise tremendous influence at
53
the NAIC. Health care providers and vendors of insurance-related
products and services may also be interested parties, in addition to representatives of outside experts like the American Academy of Actuaries. But
“interested parties” also include consumer representatives.
The NAIC is unusual in that it pays the expenses of a number of
consumer representatives to participate in its deliberations. Under its
consumer representation program, initiated in 1992, each year the
NAIC chooses a number of individuals to serve as “funded” consumer

50

See NAIC Exposure Document Index, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMISSIONERS & CENTER
INS. POL’Y & RES., http://www.naic.org/committees_exposure_drafts.htm (last
visited Mar. 15, 2011) (displaying the list of the most recent “exposed” documents).
51
For a list of the NAIC’s committees, see Committees & Activities, NAT’L ASS’N INS.
COMMISSIONERS & CENTER FOR INS. POL’Y & RES., http://www.naic.org/index_
committees.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2011).
52
See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, 2011 COMMITTEE LIST 4-11 (2011), available at
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_cmtelist.pdf (listing the structure and
membership of the Plenary and Executive Committees).
53
See Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, NAIC Names 2010 Consumer
Liaison Representatives (Mar. 2, 2010), available at http://www.naic.org/Releases/
2010_docs/2010_consumer_reps.htm (listing the 2010 funded and unfunded consumer representatives).
FOR
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54

representatives. During 2010, when the NAIC fulfilled many of its
statutory responsibilities under PPACA, eighteen funded consumer
representatives were chosen, seventeen of whom were able to serve for
55
the entire year. These consumer representatives may join NAIC conference calls without charge—other interested parties must pay a perminute fee—and receive an annual budget to cover the cost of attend56
ing the NAIC’s three annual meetings. The NAIC also has a Consumer Participation Board of Trustees consisting of six consumer representatives and six commissioners. This Board selects the other consumer
representatives, appoints a consumer liaison committee, and represents
57
the interests of NAIC consumers.
Funded consumer representatives must represent legitimate consumer organizations that cannot cover the costs of consumer participation and must demonstrate consumer-oriented skills and an exper58
tise in insurance issues. During 2010, the consumer representatives
primarily represented state-based consumer advocacy organizations,
59
although some represented national organizations. Four, including
60
the author, were law professors. For 2010, ten additional consumer
representatives, representing national disease and consumer advocacy
organizations that could afford to cover their expenses, served as un61
funded consumer representatives.

54

See Consumer Participation at NAIC, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMISSIONERS & CENTER FOR
INS. POL’Y & RES., http://www.naic.org/consumer_participation.htm (last visited Mar. 15,
2011) (describing the funded representative program and application process).
55
See Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, supra note 53. One of the consumer representatives was hired to work for CCIIO.
56
Consumer Participation at NAIC, supra note 54.
57
See Agenda, Executive (Ex) Committee, Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, attachment 1, § 2
(Mar. 27, 2010), available at http://www.naic.org/meetings1003/ex_materials.pdf (describing the structure, election process, and term of service for the NAIC Consumer
Participation Board).
58
See 2011 Criteria for Selection, NAIC Funded Consumer Liaison Representatives, NAT’L
ASS’N INS. COMM’RS & CENTER FOR INS. POL’Y & RES., http://www.naic.org/
documents/consumer_participation_funded_con_Criteria.pdf (last visited Mar. 15,
2011) (presenting preferences and qualifications for funded representatives).
59
See Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, supra note 53 (providing names
and professions of the funded representatives).
60
Id.
61
Id. For the list of 2011 unfunded representatives, see 2011 NAIC Unfunded
Consumer Representatives, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMISSIONERS & CENTER FOR INS. POL’Y
& RES., http://www.naic.org/documents/consumer_participation_unfunded_reps.pdf
(last visited Mar. 15, 2011).
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At least a dozen of the NAIC consumer representatives have been
directly and continuously involved in the PPACA implementation
62
process. The PPACA-mandated task force that was formed under the
auspices of the NAIC to develop uniform definitions of coverage documents and other standardized definitions also included several con63
sumer representatives. Consumer representatives were present at all
open meetings discussing implementation of the legislation and on
the approximately 200 hours of conference calls discussing implementation issues. In fact several consumer representatives were usually
present. Consumers regularly submitted written comments on draft
proposals. These comments typically went through several internal
drafts and were submitted as a joint product signed by a number of
consumer representatives. Consumer advocates were also able to pool
their resources and hire an actuary to advise them on the technical issues raised by various proposed model laws and rules.
Public participation in rulemaking and regulation is not, of
course, unique to the NAIC. Under the federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA), an agency must publish a proposed rule, accept
comments on the rule, consider the comments, and publish a final
64
rule with a response to the comments. Consumer advocates often
submit comments to agencies. Attempts have been made in the past to
fund or to institutionalize consumer advocacy in the rulemaking
65
process, and public representatives have also played a role in negotiated
66
rulemaking.

62

The details of the consumer-representative process included herein are based
on my own personal knowledge.
63
See Attachments to Letter from Jane Cline, President, Nat’l Ass’n of Ins.
Comm’rs, et al. to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., and
Hilda Solis, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Labor (Dec. 17, 2010), available at
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_b_consumer_information_ppaca_final_
materials.pdf (listing membership of the consumer information subgroup).
64
See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006) (prescribing the administrative rulemaking process).
65
See 1 C.F.R. § 305.71-6 (1991) (providing recommendations attempting to balance meaningful public participation with effective agency performance); Carl Tobias,
Great Expectations and Mismatched Compensation: Government Sponsored Public Participation
in Proceedings of the Consumer Product Safety Commission, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 1101, 1102-10
(1986) (describing an approach that reimbursed individuals for costs of participating
in administrative proceedings).
66
See, e.g., Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Negotiated Rulemaking Before Federal Agencies: Evaluation of Recommendations by the Administrative Conference of the United States, 74 GEO. L.J.
1625, 1687-88 (1986) (reporting on “consumer interest representatives’ involvement”
in an FTC rule revision).
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But public participation in APA rulemaking is inherently limited.
Agencies certainly receive input from the public in the rule-drafting
process. HHS, for example, solicited public comments very early in its
process with respect to the various issues raised by PPACA, such as the
definition of “unreasonable premium increases” or how to implement
67
PPACA’s minimum medical-loss ratio requirement. A federal agency, however, may not disclose the contents of a proposed or final rule
68
until it is published in the federal register. The process allows no
explicit opportunity for an open give-and-take discussion of regulatory
alternatives. Once a proposed rule is issued, moreover, it is often too late
69
to alter the rule’s content substantially. The NAIC process—in which interested parties are involved at every step of the process—permits much increased public participation.
Greater public involvement might simply amplify the voice of regulated parties absent the direct involvement of consumers. Funding
consumer involvement in a regulatory process, on the other hand, insures that consumer voices are heard. Most importantly, assuring a
critical mass of consumer participants in a regulatory process makes it
much more likely that consumers will actually affect the regulatory
product. Regulatory boards often include token consumer representation, but consumer advocates tend to be outnumbered and their
70
voices drowned out. A critical mass of consumer advocates is necessary to provide mutual support, develop and articulate ideas and positions, and avoid burnout. The NAIC consumer involvement program
during 2010 achieved these goals.
67

See Medical Loss Ratios, 75 Fed. Reg. 19,297 (Apr. 14, 2010) (to be codified at
26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, and 48 C.F.R. pts. 146 & 148) (inviting public
comments on implementing PPACA’s minimum medical-loss ratio requirement);
Premium Review Process, 75 Fed. Reg. 19,335 (Apr. 14, 2010) (to be codified at 48
C.F.R. pts. 146 & 148) (inviting public comments on defining unreasonable premium
increases); see also Requests for Comment, U.S. DEPARTMENT HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES,
http://www.hhs.gov/ociio/regulations/requests/index.html (last visited Mar. 15,
2011) (requesting public comments on other health care–related regulatory issues).
68
See 1 C.F.R. § 17.1 (2010) (explaining that the Office of the Federal Register
holds documents confidentially until publication).
69
Although an administrative agency may change a proposed rule before it is finalized, if the rule is changed too substantially, the agency must conduct a second round
of notice-and-comment rulemaking. See Chocolate Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. Block, 755
F.2d 1098, 1104 (4th Cir. 1985) (requiring the agency to be “sufficiently descriptive”
about potential changes to allow fair comment).
70
See, e.g., Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Necessary and Proper Role of Regulation to Assure
Quality of Health Care, 25 HOUS. L. REV. 525, 584 n.331 (1988) (noting that “[t]he usefulness of consumer members of medical boards has been seriously challenged”).
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IV. HOW DID THE NAIC CARRY OUT ITS PPACA RESPONSIBILITIES?
During the spring, summer, and fall of 2010, the NAIC was heavily
involved in PPACA implementation activities. It fulfilled its statutory
duty to establish definitions and methodologies for calculating mini71
mum medical-loss ratios as required by section 10101 of PPACA;
convened a task force that developed uniform definitions of coverage
documents and standardized definitions to implement section
72
1001(5); and developed a form for insurers to use in justifying un73
reasonable premium increases. The NAIC also drafted model laws to
be used by the states to implement PPACA’s exchange provisions and
74
other parts of the Act.
As a participant in this process I was struck by several things. First,
the NAIC process afforded consumer advocates impressive opportunities to influence its model laws and regulations. Consumer representatives participated in each NAIC PPACA implementation initiative
and had an impact in virtually every instance. The NAIC Health Insurance and Managed Care Committee, for example, recommitted a
draft of the premium increase justification form to the “Speed to Mar71

See Letter from Jane Cline, President, Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, et al. to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. (Oct. 27, 2010), available at
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_ex_mlr_reg_asadopted.pdf (transmitting
the uniform definitions and standard methodologies for calculating minimummedical-loss ratios); see also PPACA sec. 10101(f), § 2718(c), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-18(c)
(West Supp. 1A 2010) (laying out the NAIC’s obligations in establishing minimum
medical-loss ratios).
72
See Draft Letter from Mila Kofman, Co-Chair, Consumer Info. Subgroup, and
Teresa Miller, Co-Chair, Consumer Info. Subgroup, to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y, U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. (Nov. 15, 2010), available at http://www.naic.org/
documents/committees_b_consumer_information_101116_docs_for_adoption.pdf (describing the NAIC’s process of developing the standard definitions and standards for
summaries of benefits and coverage); see also PPACA sec. 1001(5), § 2715(a), 42
U.S.C.A. § 300gg-15(a) (providing for NAIC involvement in developing such definitions and standards).
73
See Rate Filing Disclosure Form (Nov. 10, 2010), available at http://
www.naic.org/documents/committees_b_rate_filing_disclosure_form.pdf; see also
sources cited supra note 22.
74
These other parts included the early reforms prohibiting preexisting condition
exclusions, PPACA §§ 1101, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18001 (West Supp. 1B 2010), lifetime and
annual limits, PPACA secs. 1001(5), 10101(a), § 2711, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-11 (West
Supp. 1A 2010), and cost-sharing for preventive services, PPACA sec. 1001(5), § 2713,
42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-13. They also included provisions requiring coverage of adult
children through age twenty-six, id., § 2714, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-14, and internal appeal (grievance) and external appeal (utilization review) procedures, PPACA secs.
1001(5), 10101(g), § 2719, 42 U.S.C.A. 300gg-19.
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ket Task Force” after consumers objected to the abbreviated nature of
the form, and a much more comprehensive disclosure form emerged
from the Committee the second time around. The NAIC Executive
Committee and Plenary rejected several major changes to the minimum
medical-loss ratio rule forcefully advocated by industry lobbyists in the
75
face of consumer resistance. Consumers were able to secure additional
drafting notes for a number of the framework laws that suggested consumer-friendly provisions that states could add to the implementing laws.
Second, much has been made in recent decades of the phenomenon of regulatory capture—the tendency of regulated industries to
76
gain influence over their regulators. The insurance industry has certainly been a presence throughout the PPACA-implementation proceedings and was usually able to bring to bear many more resources
than were consumers. Regulators are properly concerned about the
ongoing solvency of insurers, as, of course, are consumers. There are
limits, therefore, as to how far regulators are willing to go in restricting insurance premium increases. Brokers and agents, whom the
NAIC calls “producers,” were also a powerful presence in the NAIC
proceedings, reflecting their substantial political clout at the state level. Like consumers, insurers and other interested parties succeeded
in securing favorable changes to model laws and regulations. However, the process on the whole was balanced and responsive to consumers as well as insurers. The insurance industry certainly did not capture the PPACA NAIC regulatory process.
Third, given the political battles that shaped PPACA and continue
to buffet its implementation, the NAIC process was also remarkably
apolitical. The commissioners who make up the NAIC are politically
accountable actors. Eleven of the state commissioner members are
directly elected, and most of the remaining commissioners are ap77
pointed by governors. The commissioners can bring their states’ pol-

75

See generally Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Writing New Rules for Insurers—Progress on the
Medical Loss Ratio, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1883 (2010) (explaining NAIC’s role in developing draft regulations to define and calculate PPACA’s minimum medical-loss ratio requirement).
76
See, e.g., Jean-Jaques Laffont & Jean Tirole, The Politics of Government DecisionMaking: A Theory of Regulatory Capture, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1089, 1090-95 (1991) (explaining interest group politics via an agency framework); George J. Stigler, The Theory of
Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 (1971) (arguing that “regulation
is acquired by [an] industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit”).
77
See State Commissioners—2009, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMISSIONERS & CENTER FOR
INS. POL’Y & RES., http://www.naic.org/documents/members_state_commissioners_
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itics to bear on policy development, both through amendments
adopted at the committee or plenary level and also through instructions to their staff who participate in the working group process.
Many of the important decisions during the NAIC’s involvement in
PPACA’s implementation took place in the fall of 2010 under the
shadow of an election in which thirty-seven states were electing gover78
nors and four were electing insurance commissioners. Many of the
governors ran in opposition to PPACA. Twenty-one of the insurance
commissioner members of the NAIC represented states that sued the
79
United States in 2010 to declare parts of PPACA unconstitutional. At
least one state commissioner who ran as a Democrat and who was an
80
Of
officer of the NAIC was defeated in her bid for reelection.
course, the 2010 election moved the states considerably to the right,
and whether this development will have an impact on the politics of
the NAIC remains to be seen.
Nevertheless, virtually all of the decisions made by the NAIC in
the PPACA implementation process were unanimous. A few commissioners made speeches in open meetings criticizing PPACA, while
others spoke in its favor. In the end, however, the NAIC followed
through with its assignments of advising HHS and drafting model laws
that conformed to PPACA’s requirements, focusing on technical rather than political concerns. Attempts to undermine or deviate from
those requirements were consistently rejected.
It is quite likely that state politics affected the ultimate results of
the NAIC process. Some commissioners supported consumers more
vocally; some supported industry or producers. But the working
groups that drafted the regulations and model acts consisted of state

elected_appointed.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (listing elected and appointed state
commissioners).
78
Beyond the Results: Governors, WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/special/politics/2010-race-maps/governors (last visited Mar. 15, 2011); see also Election Will Mean New Faces in Insurance Commissioner Jobs, INS. J. (Nov. 1, 2010),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2010/11/01/114513.htm (noting
that eleven insurance commissioners are directly elected nationwide, and four elections were held in November 2010).
79
See Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 10-0091,
2011 WL 285683, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011) (naming the twenty-five states that
joined Florida in challenging PPACA’s constitutionality); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v.
Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 770-71 (E.D. Va. 2010) (noting that Virginia brought suit
to challenge the “Minimum Essential Coverage Provision” of PPACA).
80
See Election 2010: Oklahoma, N.Y. TIMES, http://elections.nytimes.com/2010/
results/oklahoma (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (displaying a map of election results).
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technical staff rather than political appointees. By the time the regulatory products reached the commissioners, they had already been vetted through a largely apolitical, open, and participatory process.
Once the drafting process was completed and recommendations were
sent to the commissioners, there was considerable momentum to abide by the process and refuse changes that were obviously motivated
by politics. Politics, therefore, largely remained in the background, and
the model laws and regulations that emerged from the process seemed to
be driven more by a desire to implement the law faithfully and in a technically manageable manner than to score political points.
Finally, the NAIC process represents a striking example of the potential power of the rule of law. PPACA has not proved to be a universally popular law; although results vary from survey to survey, most
opinion polls find that a significant number of Americans oppose the
81
law or support its repeal. The law is particularly unpopular in conservative states, as illustrated by the substantial majorities favoring antireform
82
initiatives. But PPACA is federal law, and under our constitutional
system the federal law is the supreme law of the land, binding on state
83
officials. Throughout NAIC’s involvement in the PPACA implementation process, the regulators involved seemed resolved to implement
the law as best they could interpret it. Whether regulators personally
believed it was good law or good politics rarely became an issue as the
NAIC implementation process proceeded.
Of course, many of PPACA’s provisions must still be implemented
by the states. The states may or may not enact the model laws recommended by the NAIC, and even states that follow the NAIC models
may or may not enforce these laws effectively. Implementation of the
exchanges is likely to be particularly contentious. But the NAIC
process has addressed and will continue to address many of the technical issues that the states must confront in implementing the law and

81

See, e.g., Amanda Gardner, Like Congress, Americans Split over Health-Care Reform,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/lifestyle/
content/healthday/646927.html (reporting November 2010 polling data showing that
twenty-eight percent supported repealing PPACA, thirty-one percent supported maintaining it, and twenty-nine percent were undecided).
82
Ballot issues opposing health care reform have been passed in Arizona, Missouri, and Oklahoma. Richard Cauchi, State Legislation and Actions Challenging Certain
Health Reforms, 2010 – 2011, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/
?tabid=18906 (last updated Mar. 29, 2011).
83
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“[T]he Laws of the United States . . . shall be the
supreme Law of the Land.”).
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has moved the law one step closer to implementation. The NAIC also
provides a model for the states to follow as they carry out their obligations under PPACA—focusing on the practical problems presented by
implementation rather than political rhetoric; effectively involving all
interested parties in implementation, including consumers; and attempting in good faith to follow rather than undermine the law.
CONCLUSION
The NAIC asked Congress for a role in implementing PPACA.
Congress granted the NAIC’s request, but by giving the NAIC authority, Congress also entrusted the NAIC with responsibility. On the
whole, the NAIC has respected the trust Congress placed in it and carried out its assigned tasks faithful to that trust. The unfolding result is
a regulatory product that has increased the likelihood that PPACA will
make a positive change in the American health care financing system.

